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ISLAMIC THOUGHT AND MOVEMENTS IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA

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CHAPTER 9

Moderate Islam Movement in Contemporary Indonesia

Mubamad Ali

It would be incomplete to map the contemporary Islamic thoughts and movement in Indonesia without including the moderate Islam communities, both those that belong to certain communities and movements (the active minority) and those that do not affiliate to any organizations (the silent majority). These moderate Islam communities and movements play a big role in the history of Muslims in Indonesia.

In addition to *Mubammadiyah*, *Nabdlatul Ulama*, *Persatuan Islam*, *Jami'at al-Khair*, *Al-Irsyad*, and *Mathlaul Anwar*, Islam in Indonesia has witnessed the establishment of other non-governmental organizations and epistemic community networks, such as *Perhimpunan Pesantren dan Pengembangan Masyarakat* (P3M), *Jaringan Islam Emansipatoris* (JIE), *Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia Nabdlatul Ulama* (LAKPESDAM NU) Jakarta, *Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial* (LKIS), *Paramadina*, *Jaringan Islam Liberal* (JIL), *Jaringan Islam Progresif*, *Jaringan Intelektual Muda Mubammadiyah* (JIMM), *Gerakan Islam Transformatif* (GIT), *Generasi Santri Progresif* (GSP), *Gerakan Dakwah Islam Profetik* (GARDIF), *Jaringan Filantropi Islam* (JIFI), *Gerakan Praksis Kemanusiaan Madani* (Gaprikima), International Centre for Islamic Pluralism (ICIP), Centre for Moderate Muslims (CMM), *Lembaga Studi Agama dan Demokrasi* (eISAD) Surabaya, LKPSM Yogyakarta, *Kaum Muda Nabdlatul Ulama*,

Masyarakat Santri untuk Kajian Sosial dan Advokasi Rakyat (SYARIKAT), *Lembaga Advokasi & Pendidikan Anak Rakyat* (LAPAR) Makassar, *Puan Hayati*, *Rabima*, *Lentera Hati*, and many more.¹

Nonetheless, the analysis presented in this paper will be limited to some of the above-mentioned communities, by describing their backgrounds, visions, missions, objectives and activities in order to give a brief introduction on whom exactly the moderate Islam represents, and how they struggle to realize their visions and ideas in the midst of Indonesia's plurality and the competition for influence among the Indonesian Islamic community.

Defining Moderate Islam

Defining and categorizing Islam in Indonesia are difficult tasks, yet need to be done to simplify the complex reality.² Although the groups that can be categorized as moderate have existed since the rise of Islam itself, if one delves into the Islamic text and historical resources, the term "moderate Islam" as a paradigm and movement became widely known, particularly in public discourses, after the emergence of Islamic radicalism and terrorist groups during the last decade. Hence, it is necessary to define what this paper refers to as "moderate Islam".

In a debate on moderate Islam among the Muslim and non-Muslim intellectuals in the United States in 2004, there was disagreement regarding what the moderate Islam is and who belongs to it. Different perspective and background had accordingly created multi interpretation. Ariel Cohen, a senior researcher at the US-based Heritage Foundation, defined moderate Muslims and Muslims who disagree with the "grand *jihad*" as the main dimension of belief. A moderate Muslim, according to Cohen, is a person who prioritizes dialogues and compromises with those with different interpretations of the Qur'an and with the non-Muslims.

A moderate Sunni, for example, will not support terror attacks to the Shiite or Sufi, neither to Christians, Jews, nor Hindi. A moderate, according to Cohen, respects individual rights to have different opinions, to pray according to their own beliefs, not to pray and even not to have a religion. Moderate Muslims are those who want to bring fellow humans to love and logic, rather than to threats or armed oppression. Moderate Muslims would curse suicide bombing and terror acts, and would contend religious leaders who indoctrinate such evil acts. Hence, according to Cohen, Syaikh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani (the leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of America), Abdul Hadi Palazzi (the Secretary General of the Italian Muslim Association), Ayatullah Ali Sistani, Syaikh Agha Jafri, Tashbih Sayyed, Amina Wadud, Sarah Eltantawi, and Shirin Ebadi can be categorized as moderate. It is interesting, though, that Cohen does not categorize Tariq Ramadhan, Hassan Turabi, and Yusuf al-Qaradawi as moderate only because they still allow religious radicalism in the Middle East.³

Unlike Cohen, Professor John L. Esposito, director of the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding in Georgetown University, the US, criticizes the western perspective in giving moderate labels. In the US that is politicized by right wing religious/fundamentalist groups and republicans, defining moderate Moslems in the midst of global terrorism phenomenon and the association of Islam with it makes it problematic. In the current climate, Esposito argues, the definition of moderate Muslims would depend on the political and religious affiliation of those making the judgment. Hence, people like Bernard Lewis, Daniel Pipes, Gilles Kepel, Stephen Schwartz and Pat Robertson would define moderate Islam based on their perspectives. Esposito suggests that moderate Muslims are not only those who are progressive, reformist, or liberal, but also those who are conservative and traditionalist. The moderate group in Islam, as in other religions, is the majority or the streamline in that it represents various religious, political, and socio-economic positions.

Just like moderate Jews and Christians in the US that consist of reformist, ultra-orthodox and fundamentalist, Muslim moderates also include various political and religious spectrums—those with differing political and religious views. However, what is more important according to Esposito, the moderate group comprises those who live and work “inside” the society, seek changes from the bottom, reject religious extremism, and view that violence and terrorism are illegal. The moderate group, with a different way, interprets Islam in order to respond effectively to the religious, social, political realities of their community and international affairs. Some of them Islamize their community and reject political Islam, but some do not.⁴ Meanwhile, according to Moqtedar Khan, a moderate Muslim is a person who takes a middle position in the political sphere. A moderate Muslim is someone who prefers *ijtihad* rather than *jihad*.⁵

In Indonesia, moderate Islam is also defined differently. Some people tend to use definition similar to Esposito’s, but some use Cohen’s. However, according to the working definition in the reform era, moderate Muslims are those who do not share the hard-line visions and actions of those like *Jama’ah Islamiyah* (JI), *Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia*, *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI), *Laskar Jihad*, *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI), and *Hizbut Tabrir*.⁶ Many view that moderate Muslims are represented by socio-religious organizations like *Muhammadiyah* and *Nabdatul Ulama*. As for individuals, Abdurrahman Wahid, Nurcholish Madjid, Harun Nasution, M. Syafi’i Ma’arif, KH Hasyim Muzadi, Azyumardi Azra, and KH Abdullah Gymnastiar, to name a few, are categorized as moderate. It seems that, according to psycho-social understanding of the public, moderate Islam tends to have positive connotation compared to radical Islam that connotes negatively as being something harsh. However, radical Islam groups view that moderate Islam as weak and without the religious spirit (*ghirab* and *jihad*). On the other hand, NU, *Muhammadiyah*, and other groups and religious

figures with similar line often use the moderate label to keep themselves at distance to the radical groups.

In this paper, the term “moderate Islam” refers to the Islamic communities emphasizing normal behavior (*tawassuth*) in the implementation of the religious teachings that they uphold: being tolerant towards differences of opinion, avoiding violence, and prioritizing thoughts and dialogues as their strategy. With this definition, moderate Islam is the main stream, although their systematic movement to struggle for religious and political moderation is still limited in Indonesia. The ideas of native Islam, rational Islam, progressive Islam, transformative Islam, liberal Islam, inclusive Islam, tolerant Islam, and pluralistic Islam that emerged in the 1970s are categorized as moderate. The same category can be given to ideas to re-actualize Islam, nationalize Islam, de-sacralizing, cultural Islam, contextual *ijtihad*, and others alike. The Islamist group or *Salafi* that neither uses nor allows violence and force can be categorized as moderate *Salafi* (*Salafiyah Wasathiyah*).

The Emergence of Moderate Islam in Indonesia

The historical, political, cultural and religious contexts of the emergence of the moderate Islam movement are not different from those of the radical Islam.⁷ Aside from external factors, the emergence of moderate orientation is also caused by personal preference of individuals and groups in selecting their visions, missions, programs, and movement strategies.⁸ The emergence of moderate Islamic ideas was a contextually creative choice.

Moderate Islam as the mainstream has existed in Indonesia since Islam entered peacefully and in an accommodative way towards the local cultures. The tendency to be moderate (as reflected in acceptance to others, tolerance, and pluralism) and the orientation towards Sufism and neo-Sufism (*tasawuf* plus *syariat* and activism) were part of the Islamic culture and civilization in Southeast Asia, although radical movements that

prioritize *jihad* and war also grew in some areas, such as the *Padri* movement in West Sumatra.⁹

The influence of Sunni tasawwuf, which is dominated by Imam al-Ghazali, played a great role in the character building of the moderate conservative religious movement in Indonesia, although there were also influences of Syiah, Mu'tazilah, and *Abmadiyah*.¹⁰ The theology of *Ablus Sunnah wal Jama'ah* that came and grew with the claim to take the middle way between the *Qadariyyah* theology (that emphasizes on the human's freedom of thinking) and the *Jabariyyah* theology (that emphasizes on the almighty power of God) was also a crucial factor. This was influential to the local adagio that says "*adat bersendi syara' dan syara' bersendi kitabullah*" (tradition is based on religious rites, while religious rites are based on Holy Qoran) , which was quite effective in Aceh, West Sumatera, South Sulawesi, Gorontalo, and some other areas, playing an important role in restoring the moderate conservative character in Indonesia.

During the colonial period, religious radicalism emerged with the spirit of *jihad fi sabilillah* against the Dutch and Japanese colonization. Although the Dutch colonial government struggled to oppress political Islam through various methods, such as differentiating political and religious Islam, limiting the pilgrim movement and closing the pan-Islamist trans-national network, monitoring the mosques, teacher ordinance, illegal school ordinance, intervening the religious court, appointing village chiefs, and marriage ordinance, the tendency towards radicalism in fact emerged in Aceh, West Sumatera, West Java, Central Java, South Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Madura, and some other areas.¹¹ The anti-colonization and anti-Christianization struggle that follow suit became the portrait of Islam in the 19th century and the early part of the 20th century. Moderate Islam of course still grew among the society, Islamic boarding schools, and religious organization, beginning in early 20th century and developed throughout the 20th century.

The establishment of Syarikat Islam in 1911 signified the first Islamic proto-nationalism, while the founding of

Mubammadiyah in 1912 became the start of Islam modernization in the form of puritan reform when it accepts the theological thinking of Muhammad Abduh; it was liberal in terms of education because it adopts western system; and it was liberal in terms of politic because it was cooperative towards the Dutch government and did not refuse its financial support. On the other hand, religious neutral nationalist movements also emerged, such as Budi Utomo and *Partai Nasional Indonesia* in 1927.

Meanwhile, the founding of *Nabdlatul Ulama* in 1926 was a response to Khilafah Committee's leadership in the reform group, and as a shout-out to Saudi Arabia so that the religious tradition according to the Syafi'i school of thought was continued. At that time, *Mubammadiyah* already spread out to various areas in Indonesia, and the Islamic movements could not be categorized as either moderate or radical, rather as reformist young group, elderly group, and neutral nationalist group.¹²

Although there were de-Islamizing movements, there was no violence in the name of religion. At that time, pluralistic Islamic movements differed in terms of *furu'iyah fiqh*, yet there were times when they minimized their internal conflict, such as with the establishment of *Majelis Islam Ala Indonesia* (MIAI) in 1937 that consisted of representatives from *Mubammadiyah*, NU, and Syarikat Islam, and other organizations that amounted to 21 in 1941. Masyumi rejected *Abmadiyah* in MIAI, while *Mubammadiyah*, *Partai Syarikat Islam*, and *Abmadiyah* still shared a harmonious relationship at that time until they quarreled on the problems of strategy.¹³ In the midst of the pluralistic Islamic organizations, the sentiment of nationalism and unity did not allow for the emergence of radical splinter groups that were not satisfied with the mainstream Islamic movements at that time.

During the period of Sukarno's presidency (1945-1966), moderate Islam was still maintained by NU, *Mubammadiyah*, *Persatuan Islam*, Al-Irsyad, Jami'at Khair, and various other organizations. When Islamic social organizations like NU got

involved in practical politic, the moderate Islam movement faded a little bit. NU then declared Pancasila as final, and not to support the formalization of Islamic Shari'a. Meanwhile, Masyumi, which is politically considered radical by Soekarno, was disbanded, although it kept on inspiring the establishment of conservative non-governmental organizations, such as Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah (DDI) during the Soeharto era (1966-1998). However, *Mubammadiyah* members were personally involved in radical movements, such as Abdul Kahar Muzakkar who led the *Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia* (DI/TII) in South Sulawesi, and various officials of *Hizbut Tabrir* and *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* were educated in the *Mubammadiyah* system. The main strength of this organization is its central/non-extreme position and its focus on social, educational and *tabligh* activities.

With the fall of Soeharto in 1998, the battle between moderate and radical Islam grew more intense and complex, with political dimension rather than solely based on religious matter. Moderate Islam respects intellectual and organizational plurality as the Indonesian tradition of Islam, and supports Pancasila as the state ideology. On the other hand, radical Islam questions Pancasila and the notion of nation-state while offering the concept of Islamic state, formal Islamic *Shari'a* or *Khilafah*. The terms "radical", "moderate", "progressive", "transformative", and "liberal" have political dimensions, although not always in the sense of struggle for power but more in the sense that they all moved within the contest of struggle for influence on the silent majority part of the community. Not only the hardliners, but moderate groups also make loud demands in the public sphere. Various political factors, starting from the fall of Soeharto, the following political openness and the establishment of many political parties and NGOs, press freedom, freedom of association, the weakening of law enforcement, and diversifying of religious authority due to better public education, enabled the emergence of pluralism in the contemporary Islam movements, which then added to more tense between moderate and radical Islam.

The emergence of radical and moderate Islam movements was related to global modernization and capitalism, mostly after the end of Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, aside from the issues of decentralization and regional autonomy. Within the religious context, Islamic reform in the Middle East and various Islamic thoughts in western universities also influenced the reform movements in Indonesia, although with different forms and dynamics.

Meanwhile, the tradition of Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*), Islamic schools (*madrasah*), and the Institute of Islam is also important for the development of moderate Islam movement in Indonesia. These educational systems have generated some moderate Muslim figures. Historically, the Islam-based schools have produced moderate Muslim figures, eventhough a number of people who have lived in Islamic boarding schools prefer radicalism, violence or terrorism. *Pesantren* and *madrasah* have played a great role in producing traditional and conservative religious leaders, and also those who are reformist, modernist, neo-modernist, and even liberal-secular.

Due to its moderate tradition, *pesantren* (reaching tens of thousands in number) was previously divided into categories of traditional and modern, sometimes also Salafi (moderate and radical). Lately, they have been categorized as traditional, modern, moderate Salafi, and radical Salafi (minority). Gontor Ponorogo *Pesantren* in East Java is considered as a modern type that has been influential to the development of moderate Islam in contemporary Indonesia. Darussalam *Pesantren* in Ciamis, for example, teaches its students the vision to "Become Moderate Muslim, Democratic *Mukmin*, and Diplomatic *Mubsin*".¹⁴ The Al-Mukmin *Pesantren* in Ngruki is often considered as the radical Salafi type. However, the vision and mission of thousands of other *pesantrens* can be considered moderate, both in traditional and modern terms.

Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama: The Main Bases for Moderate Islam

Some of the radical activists were previously *pesantren* students and ex-modernist activists from Muhammadiyah. However, they took up radical method due to dissatisfaction and disagreement with the missions and visions of Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama (NU). Moreover, Muhammadiyah and NU were the guardians of moderate Islam in Indonesia. They have produced moderate Islam communities with varying foci, strategies and scopes of issues, yet still within the moderate traditions of Muhammadiyah and NU.

Muhammadiyah's establishment was influenced by Islamic reform in Egypt and the Middle East, however was local-oriented, based on the interpretation of the local condition in Java at the time, including the intensifying of Christianization in Indonesia, the penetration of the Dutch, the inefficiency of the traditional Islamic educational institutions, and apathy of some neutral national groups towards the role of Islam.

During its early period in 1912, Muhammadiyah formulated its objective as:

"menyebarkan pengajaran Kanjeng Nabi Mubammad SAW kepada penduduk bumi putera, di dalam residensi Yogyakarta, dan memajukan bal agama Islam kepada anggota-anggotanya." (Spreading the teaching of the Prophet Muhammad to the natives, inside the residency of Yogyakarta, and promoting Islam to its members).

This formulation underwent improvement in line with its development. In 1959, it was changed into:

"menegakkan dan menjunjung tinggi agama Islam sehingga terwujud masyarakat Islam yang sebenar-benarnya." (Implementing and highly respecting Islam in order to establish a true Islamic society).

In 2000, it reads:

*"Mubammadiyah adalah Gerakan Islam, Dakwah Amar Ma'ruf Nabi Munkar, berasaskan Islam yang bersumber pada Al-Qur'an dan As-Sunnab."*¹⁵ (Muhammadiyah is an Islamic Movement, teaching the Amar Ma'ruf Nabi Munkar/always doing good deeds, and avoiding bad ones, based on Islam by referring to the Qur'an and *Sunnab*).

The continuous process to search and interpret the principles, objectives and aims according to religious and non-religious contexts lies within the true goals of the Islamic community. Muhammadiyah's efforts were dominant throughout its history, through schools and universities, hospitals, orphanages, and printing companies. However, it was in the religious field that it was most dominant, including omitting customary rituals that were considered non-religious (*bid'ab*), such as seventh-month of pregnancy rituals, thanksgiving celebrations, *manakiban*, *barjanzi* (chant recounting the Prophet's life, usually recited on 10th of the month of Muharram), *haul* (vow), *yasinan* (reciting Chapter 37 of the Qur'an, usually when someone is dying or recently died), thoughts leading to the establishment of the Tajrih Assembly (1927), praying guidelines, also its support for the establishment of the Department of Religious Affairs, the formulation of "*Matan Keyakinan dan Cita-cita Hidup Mubammadiyah*". Muhammadiyah also took part in nationalist movements, and it was active in *Majelis Islam Ala Indonesia* (MIAI), and kept its support for the government post-independence. With its autonomous organizations such as Aisyiah, Nasyiatul Aisyiah, The Youth of *Mubammadiyah*, *Mubammadiyah* Youth Association, *Mubammadiyah* Students Association, *Tapak Suci Putra Mubammadiyah*, and *Hizbul Wathan* Movement, *Mubammadiyah* built a vast and solid network covering almost all regions in Indonesia.

During the period of KH A.Azhar Basyir (1990-1995), for example, Muhammadiyah had a program in various fields, including on Islamic faith, education, health, public development, culture, political participation, economy and entrepreneurship, youth empowerment, family development, women empowerment, environment, and the improvement of human resource quality. It was since the period of M.Amien Rais (1995-2000) that Muhammadiyah became more vocal in promoting reform thinking related to global issues, Islam, and national issues. Amien Rais developed religious thinking,

science and technology, economic base, social movement, and scientific movement.¹⁶

Muhammadiyah held religious dialogues as part of its activities. For example, during its first five years, Muhammadiyah held an open debate in South Sulawesi in 1928, attended by local government, religious leaders, and public figures. The debate was on issues contended among the Muhammadiyah reformist group and the traditionalist groups at that time, such as *Shirathal Mustaqim* and the As'adiyah *Pesantren*.¹⁷ Muhammadiyah was obliged to be the balance between purification and dynamization, between efforts to purify and the condition of the local culture that was not to be eliminated, as well as maintaining the vision and mission of teaching *amar maruf nabi munkar* moderately, non-radically, and without violence.¹⁸

In the post-1998 era, when many new radical Islam groups emerged, Muhammadiyah and NU are considered as moderate and trustworthy as a civil society power to oppress radicalism and militarism. They were considered like a factory that produces moderate and inclusive Islam.¹⁹ Muhammadiyah and NU have produced the young generation who promote moderate, progressive and liberal thinking, such as LAKPESDAM NU, P3M and Emancipatory Islam, the Muhammadiyah Young Intellectuals Network, International Center for Islamic Pluralism, Rahima, Puan Hayati, and other NGOs that emerged in the post-1998 era.

In the beginning, KH Ahmad Dahlan as the man of action with the theology of the *Al-Ma'un* Chapter succeeded in establishing a number of orphanage and class-system education. His successors then established *Dakwah Amar Maruf Nabi Munkar*, formulated the mission and goals of Muhammadiyah's struggle, while maintaining the purification doctrine (*tandbif al-aqidah al-islamiyah*) from non-religious rituals and beliefs (including *takbayyul*, *bid'ab* and *kburafat*); and finally Muhammadiyah published a book entitled "The Islamic Life Guidance for Muhammadiyah Community" (*Pedoman Hidup Islami Warga Muhammadiyah*) in 2000. At

the same time, Muhammadiyah kept emphasizing the importance of *ijtihad* and *tajdid*, but not the doctrine of *jihad fi sabilillah* in the sense of war and use of force. In its teachings, Muhammadiyah categorizes its doctrines as internal and external, and they are aimed to simplify and provide good information in amiable and non-violent manner. .

Ideas contained in Muhammadiyah teaching include culture, social *taubid* (recognizing the oneness of God), and consistency in keeping distance from practical politics, although its members are not forbidden from—and even supported to—establishing Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) as their political vehicle. However, the low support for PAN from Muhammadiyah itself has shown the reluctance of Muhammadiyah group members regarding practical politics. Meanwhile, the relation between Muhammadiyah and political parties has had its difficulties. Muhammadiyah in the past supported Masyumi and *Partai Muslimin Indonesia* (PARMUSI). Muhammadiyah succeeded in establishing itself as a civil organization (Robert Hefner) and part of the civil society (Nakamura). Because Muhammadiyah is not formally a party or an organization with orientation towards power politics, it therefore becomes safer for Muhammadiyah to conducting maneuvers and keeping its central balanced position, such as during the colonial time when Muhammadiyah did not take up any radical position against the Dutch colonialism.²⁰

As a result of its 44th Convention in Jakarta in 2000, Muhammadiyah formalized its Islamic ideology in the form of a reference book called *Pedoman Hidup Islami Warga Muhammadiyah* (Islamic Life Guidance for the Muhammadiyah Community). This guide contains the Islamic perspective on life and the Islamic life of the Muhammadiyah members, including personal life, family life, societal life, organizational life, business, profession, environment preservation, science and technology development, and art and culture. What is interesting is that, although the guide should be a reference of all Muhammadiyah members, it only contains principles,

values and norms that are actual, giving guidance, ideal, religious, and simplifying in nature (*taisir*).

In terms of living in a society, the guide emphasizes that Islam teaches all Muslims to maintain brotherhood and good deeds amongst themselves, including with neighbors and all parts of the community, by respecting the rights and dignities of fellow Muslims as well as the non-Muslims. When being neighbors of non-Muslims, fellow Muslims are advised to treat them fairly and give them respect, and to maintain tolerance based on Islamic principles. The guidelines also mention the principles to respect human dignity, brotherhood and equality, cooperation, tolerance, respect for freedom of others, justice, equal treatment, love and non-violence.²¹

According to M. Amien Rais, the Muhammadiyah doctrines include the dimension to uphold pure *tauhid*, public education, teaching good deeds, cooperation and non-practical-politics.²² Haidar Nashir, an official in Muhammadiyah, explained that Muhammadiyah is and should continue to be an ideological Islamic movement, because Muhammadiyah is an Islamic movement that believes in Islam as the only right religion, based on *tauhid*, the Qur'an, and the Prophet. Muhammadiyah also aims to establish a community of *khairu ummah* and *baldatun thayyibatun wa rabbun ghafur*. Muhammadiyah's strategy includes purification, revitalization, reform, dynamization, and transformation. Muhammadiyah, according to Haidar Nashir, always upholds *ukhuwah Islamiyah* (unity among the Islamic community) and *ishlah* (rethinking) to establish *rahmatan lil a'lam*.²³

In the past decade, pressure to revitalize the *Muhammadiyah tajdid* (identity) grew stronger, especially among the young generation, and supported by some of the older generation who are concerned with the stagnation of the *tajdid* tradition within the organization. In the midst of the emergence of new socio-religious mass organizations and communities after 1998, Muhammadiyah was obliged to reposition its identity and struggle. For example, Muhammadiyah was demanded to keep distance from religious

radicalism, while strengthening itself as a moderate Islamic agent. More strategically, Muhammadiyah must face challenges from pluralism, spiritualism, democratization, formalization of Islamic *Shari'a*, global and regional terrorism, religion-based violence, Islamic liberalization, and other challenges.²⁴

Meanwhile, although Nahdlatul Ulama was established later, it was at first considered to represent Islamic traditionalism because it was established by ulemas from Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*). It carries the Islamic visions and missions in conserving the theology of *Ahlussunnah waljama'ah* that is accommodative towards local cultures. Until now, the development of NU has been complex and dynamic, although it continues to be regarded as a representative of moderate traditionalist Islam. NU was established as a response to two big events: the abolition of the *khilafah* system in Turkey and the Wahhabi attack in Mecca. NU was established to maintain the challenged religious rituals. At that time, the Wahhabis are seen as related to rituals, such as visiting the graves, *tablil* prayers, belief in the *wali*. NU also had to protect the schools *Ahlussunnah wal-jama'ah* and *Syafi'i*, which were already followed by many ulemas and *pesantrens* particularly in Java. NU had to increase the number of its boarding schools, schools, mosques, praying houses, and also had to care for the orphans and the poor, advancing the agriculture sector and other businesses allowed by Islam.²⁵

NU's movement was dynamic in the changing political context. In the early phase of independence, NU figures such as KH Wahid Hasyim had to face the problems of Islam-and-state relations—such as in the context of the Jakarta Charter, Islamic *Shari'a*, Islam as a religion-based state—which led to the conflict between the nationalist and Islamic groups. NU was involved in the establishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 1946, which was considered as a compromise between two radical forces—Islamic state and secular state. NU as a political party gained 18 % of votes in the first election in 1955 and in the 1971 election. When the threat of communism emerged in the 1960s, NU was involved as the

counter-movement, as it was striving to keep Soekarno from the influence of communism.

The New Order era gave a new context for the NU development. NU was forced by the *Golongan Karya* party and the Indonesian Armed Forces (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia/ABRI*), and was in conflict with the political powers of the New Order that resulted in the fusion of Islamic parties into the Unity and Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/PPP*). NU quit PPP, and decided to return to its original identity declared in 1926. This decision was made in its 1984 Convention in Situbondo. In the context of political moderation, NU returned to Pancasila, as emphasized by KH Ahmad Siddiq, an influential NU figure. In one of his speeches, he said: "The state principle is Pancasila and Islam; two things that can coexist and support each other." He also strongly accepts Pancasila as the main principle of mass and political organizations. On the relationship between Islam and Pancasila, KH Ahmad Siddiq stated that: "the current form of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is the final result of the efforts to establish the nation, including the Islamic community... Islam in Indonesia is majority, thus all problems of the Indonesian people is identical with the problem of the Islamic community in Indonesia.

Hence, Pancasila as a state ideology is justified by Islam."²⁶ KH Ahmad Siddiq was also the person suggesting the brotherhood trilogy concept (*ukhuwah Islamiyah, wataniyah, and basyariah*). On the importance of moderation, KH Siddiq for example explained that, "Islam does not allow extremism and over-reaction". He interpreted *tawassuth* and *i'tidal* as common practice. "It is common to view things and act normally towards it, not over-reacting neither insufficiently-reacting".²⁷ According to Andrée Feillard, this middle way is suitable with the Javanese tradition, which is characterized by the search for harmony in the community. Meanwhile, Benedict Anderson regarded NU as a group that wants to maintain and expand the religious life pattern.²⁸

NU's moderate vision and mission was continuously developed by the next NU leaders. Abdurrahman Wahid, for example, suggested the idea of "*Pribumisasi Islam*" (establishing Islam with more Indonesian characteristics), which then inspired the movement of the NU youth in the 1990s, with proponents such as Khamami Zada, M. Imdadun Rahmat, Rumaadi, and Ahmad Baso.²⁹ Meanwhile, KH Hasyim Muzadi also strived for maintaining NU's religious characteristics rather than its political characteristics, although he was once attracted to the nomination for vice president with Megawati. In fact, NU is not a monolithic movement, as it has also been faced with internal disputes and arguments, as they consist of conservative and progressive groups. Some demand to modernize the *pesantren* system and conduct rethinking. This progressive group is more prominent among the young generation of NU.

NU also maintains several institutions within it, such as the Indonesian Islam Students Movement (*Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia*) and the Female Muslims of NU (*Muslimat NU*). The women movement played a significant role in transmitting moderate Islamic values. Muslimat NU was established in December 1940 in Surabaya, and later went through reform on 29 March 1946 in Purwokerto and 1952 in Palembang. It states that "through the struggle of Muslimat NU, Islam women serve the religion, nation, and state". Muslimat NU also aims to "establish an Indonesian community, particularly the women, that is religious, communal, and nationalist". This institution aims to "produce qualified, independent, and religious women".

In 2006, for example, Muslimat NU established a female Islamic boarding school in Aceh after the tsunami tragedy, in cooperation with a private TV station. They often conduct training programs, for example on healthy food. They also cooperate with local governments to conduct women empowerment programs in poor areas. As symbolized by their logo, Muslimat NU follows the teaching method of Wali Songo, which promotes peace, wisdom, and non-violence. Muslimat

NU conducts various social, religious, and cultural programs and activities, particularly those related to the development of NU women and the Muslim community in general.³⁰

When the New Order regime became suspicious of Islam, particularly in terms of the political expression that was limitedly channeled at that time through PPP as the fusion of several formerly-NU Islamic parties, new thinking emerged to find a solution to the stagnant relation between the Muslims and the nationalists. New theological approach towards *ijtihad* was made to suit both the modern and the traditional context. A moderate Islam approach became the alternative to formalist, legalist, and scriptural approaches of some Muslim thinkers and political activists.

The intellectuals have suggested that Islam should not have to dictate all aspects of life. Islam only regulates the general principles of life. They suggest that the Islamization process should not be in conflict with the local culture. Generally, the intellectuals suggest a middle path between orthodox Islamic political theories that combine Islam and formal politic and the secular state concept that completely divides religion and state and marginalizes the role of religion in public life. They suggest that Pancasila is the best and most realistic ideology for both Muslims and non-Muslims in Indonesia. Although they refer to *Mitsaq al-Madinah* (The Madina Charter, signed by Prophet Muhammad, the Jews, and the *Musyrikin* community), they only refer to it as an inspiration for a social contract of a modern civil society that respects religious pluralism.

This intellectual Islam movement—including de-sacralization, re-actualization, localization, neo-modernism, Islam rationalization, Islam liberalism, liberal Islam, cultural Islam, contextualization, contextual Islam, and others alike—made big influence in the Islamic discourse in Indonesia. Important intellectual figures of this movement from the 1970s until the 1990s include Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, Harun Nasution, Munawir Sjadzali, and Djohan Effendi. During this period, a generation of young Muslim intellectuals emerged from NU, Muhammadiyah, and Islamic Institute (now Islam

University), all of whom were inspired by their predecessors. The result of the 1999 and 2004 elections showed the primacy of Pancasila. Among the liberal Muslims, although there were 48 Islamic political parties in the 1999 election, the election was considered as the victory of cultural Islam over the political Islam. Islam is not a marketable political commodity among the Indonesian voters. Most of the Indonesian people support Pancasila as a platform. According to Giora Eliraz, neo-modernism, or liberal Islam, in Indonesia greatly contributed to this process to strengthen pluralism, tolerance, and harmony. The progressive and liberal orientation of Islam in Indonesia opens up for modernity, democracy, and human rights. It is supported by the dynamic intellectual movement. One characteristic of this progressive intellectual movement is *ijtihad*, as a replacement for *taqlid* practiced by Muslim conservatives.³¹ A few of the institutions that promote reform and universal humanity is *Perhimpunan Pesantren dan Pengembangan Masyarakat* (P3M), LKiS, *Paramadina*, Liberal Islam Network (*Jaringan Islam Liberal*/JIL), *Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah* (JIMM), *Gerakan Islam Transformatif* (GIT), *Generasi Santri Progresif* (GSP), *Gerakan Dakwah Islam Profetik* (GARDIF), *Jaringan Filantropi Islam* (JIFI), *Gerakan Praksis Kemanusiaan Madani* (Gaprikima), International Center for Islamic Pluralism and Center for Moderate Muslims.³²

Among those that are active in promoting moderate Islam visions is the youth generation of NU, assembled in various study and research groups and institutes, such as LKiS (Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial) Yogyakarta, elSAD (*Lembaga Studi Agama dan Demokrasi*) Surabaya, Lakpesdam NU (*Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia*) Jakarta, LKPSM Yogyakarta, *Kaum Muda NU*, *Syarikat (Masyarakat Santri untuk Kajian Sosial dan Advokasi Rakyat)*, and LAPAR (*Lembaga Advokasi & Pendidikan Anak Rakyat*) Makassar.

These epistemic communities do not only conduct study and research on various religious thinking, philosophy and social theories, but they also do field works to serve the local

community in the form of assistance, advocating, and demonstration. Their background is either *pesantren*, students or graduates. They were or are still involved in NU or *Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia* (PMII).³³ According to Martin van Bruinessen, PMII is the most dynamic student organization in terms of intellectual discourse. They read not only traditional books, but also books on philosophy and social theories. Their discussions include issues of Third World countries, economic justice, human rights, civil society, democracy, and many more.³⁴

P3M and the Emancipatory Islam Network

One of the bases for moderate Islam in Indonesia is *pesantren* and the grassroots community. The Jakarta-based *Pesantren* and Community Development Association (*Perbimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat / P3M*) was established on 18 May 1983, and has been a very active NGO since then. P3M aims to develop the Islamic knowledge and thinking on education and social affairs, increase the role of *pesantrens* in development, and expand human resources towards the welfare of the nation. P3M's visions and missions include social transformation with socio-economic-cultural approaches, based on critical and emancipatory religious visions, through the increase of the quality of human and institutional resources.³⁵ The activities of P3M are in the fields of education and training, politic, poverty and gender, all of which take place throughout Indonesia. During its first five years, P3M focused on issues of women empowerment, gender, human rights, democracy, children, and religious studies. In addition to that, P3M is also active in studies, research, surveys, education and training, publication, advocacy, and seminars. P3M's activities also include tutoring homeless children in *pesantrens*, supporting women's reproductive rights, democracy and human rights education, and campaigning peaceful election.

P3M strategy is criticizing conventional socio-religious beliefs that tend to justify status-quo and unsupportive to the welfare of the community. Hence, they need to develop a critical and emancipatory religious discourse based on objective and cross-boundaries humanitarian issues. P3M seeks to establish and promote social changes, particularly at the grassroots level, based on the public's critical awareness. To obtain its objectives, P3M organizes workshops with critical religious leaders to mediate religious thinking and empiric social realities. P3M organizes education and training for the youth to facilitate the changes and development at the grassroots level. P3M disseminates information to the public through mass media.

Since January 2003, P3M has been involved in the *pesantren*-based Anti-Corruption Movement (*Gerakan Anti Korupsi / GAK*), which was established based on the concern of serious and acute corruption practices in the country. They view that Islam as a religion has also given legitimacy to corruption practices, and has failed to nurture a moral sensitivity on Muslims against corruption. Hence, *Bahtsul Masail*, a forum among religious leaders to discuss various issues, is also concerned of this matter. GAK's agenda include promoting morality against corruption, and publishing a pocket guidebook, distributed during Friday prayers, that discusses topics on corruption, religion, culture, and how to fight corruption. This movement has also published a book entitled "*Korupsi di Negeri Kaum Beragama: Ikhtiar Membangun Fiqh Anti-Korupsi*" and "*Memerangi Korupsi: Geliat Agamawan atas Problem Korupsi di Indonesia*".

Aside from GAK, P3M also organizes the *Santri* Government Program. It is an educational program on democracy directed at *santris* (*pesantren* students), established in 2003. This program aims to support the democratization process from the bottom level, through the understanding and implementation of democratic values in the public's transcendental beliefs. P3M publishes magazines called *Halqah* and *Sebat*. The *Halqah* magazine is published since 1997 and distributed to

thousands of *pesantrens* in the P3M network. It aims to spread the ideas of democracy and pluralism. In *Halqab* No. 19 (2003), for example, the main theme was the freedom of expression in Islam. It was related to the hot issue of the formalization of Islamic *Shari'a* that does not respect diversity. This magazine suggests that diversity is considered a blessing in Islam through the doctrine of *rahmatan lil alamin*. In this edition, KH Said Aqiel Siradj, one of NU leaders, was interviewed. He explained the history of the debate and ways of responding to this issue. Other *Halqab* editions had more contemporary issues as the theme, such as the Laws on National Education System (May 2003), Leadership (July 2003), Political Islam and Public Articulation (September 2003), Impacts of Globalization (November 2003), and General Election (January 2004). The Political Islam and Public Articulation edition discussed the development of radical Islam movements, such as Front Pembela Islam, Laskar Jihad, and Hizbut Tahrir, that claim to support and struggle for the Islamic *Shari'a*. This magazine answered the question whether the radical movement was really articulating the public's political interest or only the elite's.

Following the establishment of P3M, the Emancipatory Islam Network (*Jaringan Islam Emansipatoris*) was founded by NU and P3M, aiming to empowering *pesantrens* in particular and the public in general. According to the founders, emancipatory Islam offers the religious paradigm that strives to resolve humanitarian problems in real life as the main commitment of religion. The interpretation used by this group does not come from and end at texts. Rather, it comes from and ends at the reality. The holy texts only function as a gleam in resolving humanitarian issues. The emancipatory Islam paradigm strives for the resolution of the internal contradiction of textual paradigm.

Throughout 2004 and 2006, P3M and the Emancipatory Islam Network organized the Emancipatory Islam Training, in cooperation with the senates of various universities and institutes in Indonesia. The material included the Qur'an

methodology, hermeneutics, theology of freedom, and social analysis. With facilitators, such as Masdar Farid Mas'udi, Zuhairi Misrawi, Nur Rofiah, Hasan Basri, and Very Verdiansyah, and resource persons such as Dr Haryatmoko (lecturer on philosophy), Dr Amin Abdullah (lecturer on philosophy), Dr Komaruddin Hidayat (lecturer on philosophy), and Dr Herry Priyono and Trisno S. Susanto from Inter-Religious Dialogue Community (*Masyarakat Dialog Antar Agama/MADIA*), this activity is expected to form cadres who are aware of Islamic discourses on the active participation of emancipatory movements in their respective environments.³⁶

In its visions, the Emancipatory Islam Network supports progressive and emancipatory religious life through the dissemination and training programs. These ideas grew from the concern of the emergence of various conservative, textual, and intolerant Muslim groups. According to Masdar F. Mas'udi, emancipatory Islam is different to scriptural, textual, formal, ideological, and modernist Islam. Mas'udi explains that emancipatory Islam is different from 'traditional Islam', 'fundamental Islam', and 'liberal Islam' because the latter three focus on text debate rather than reality. According to the other proponent, Zuhairi Mishrawi, textual and ideological interpretation is theocentric, while emancipatory Islam focuses on humanity. Emancipatory Islam is influenced by the thinking of Hassan Hanafi, Asghar Ali Engineer, Farid Essack, Nasr Abu Zaid, Muhammad Arkoun and Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri.³⁷

One of the activities of the Emancipatory Islam Network is its participation in Anti-Violence Public Alliance (*Aliansi Masyarakat Anti Kekerasan*), which was established as a reaction to the radical Islam groups' attack on the Fahmina Institute in Cirebon on 21 May 2006, and the threat to forced dismantling of the inter-religious dialogue in Purwakarta, West Java, on 23 May 2006. The network also published Masdar F. Mas'udi's paper on the position of *Abmadiyah*. The paper was considered as misleading and not part of an Islamic thinking by Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), through its decree in 2005. Mas'udi argues that the state must guarantee the freedom to

religion of the *Abmadiyah* members because they are legitimate Indonesian citizens. The network also supports a group of NU officials who questions the relevance of MUI decrees that forbids pluralism, secularism, and liberalism. They view that these decrees have trespassed MUI's jurisdiction and are extraordinary.

On the issue of terrorism, the Emancipatory Islam Network promotes the discourse of anti-terror Islam, and that suicide bombing and terrorism are not *jihad*. They do this through talkshows, discussions, and publications. The network continues to promote Islam as a teaching on brotherhood and humanity (*al-ukhuwwah al-insaniyyah*), and Islam as an ethical teaching rather than political ideology. The network also publishes a bulletin every Friday, which covers actual themes, such as the theology of earthquake; responses to the earthquake that occurred in various regions in Indonesia; poverty awareness; interpretation of *jihad* not as violence that threatens freedom and beliefs; dialogues on civilization; close relation between law and morality; and calling for *ijtihad* (rethinking). As for the trend of some religious leaders and Islam groups that condemn other groups that are different to them (*al-idhbal wa al-takfir*), the network views it as an act that tries to surpass the authority of God.

Institute for Human Resources Studies

Along with its movement back to its founding principles of 1926, NU established the NU Institute for Human Resources Studies (*Lembaga Kajian dan Sumber Daya Manusia/LAKPESDAM*), in Jakarta on 7 April 1985. It serves as an element within the NU organization, which has been mandated by the 27th NU General Assembly in Situbondo and later legalized as an institute by the 29th NU General Assembly in Cipasung as an organization that conducts studies, education, and publication in its efforts to establish a welfare, just, and democratic society. The background for its establishment is the fact that the potentials of thousands of *pesantrens* and

tens of millions of village communities that serve as the mass base of NU have not been optimally employed through education and community development. Tens of millions of NU community, spread in various villages, have strong cultural bonds. They consist of farmers, fishermen, salespeople, small-scale entrepreneurs, handicraft workers, and factory workers; all of whom are not yet empowered. LAKPESDAM has the vision to serve as the facilitator and catalyst in establishing a conducive environment for a just order within the community, based on *Ahlussunnah waljama'ah*.

Its mission is to increase the capacity of the NU cadre and institution, strengthen the capacity of NU members, and develop critical discourse on religion, social, and culture. The institute aims to develop the NU human resources, so that they become more religious, more intellect, more professional, more independent, and more hard-willing to establish welfare, independent, just, and civilized community.³⁸ With such vision, mission, and objective, LAKPESDAM positions itself as the supporter of Islam moderation in Indonesia. Its strategy excludes *jihad*, intolerance, force, and violence. Rather, it strives to develop a critical discourse on religious life, although still within the framework of *Ahlussunnah waljama'ah*, which they believe is the moderate way. As a civic organization and part of the civil society, NU and its LAKPESDAM offer a religious paradigm that orientates on faith, knowledge, welfare, independence, justice, and civilization.

From 1985 to 1994, LAKPESDAM focused its activities on community development. It was not until 1995 that it not only distanced itself from radical Islam movements which then massively emerged since 1998, but also declared religious radicalism as a strategic issue to be responded through critical education.³⁹ More specifically, it aims to develop the religious attitude and behavior that is more moderate and tolerant. Its activities do not only include issues, such as organizational reform of the NU cadre programs through education, training, comparative studies and civic education, but also critical studies on NU, religious life, social affairs, and culture. In its 1996

strategic planning, LAKPESDAM changed its vision to “empowering civil society through the principle of *mabadi' kbairi ummah*, which is the five basic principles of community: *al-shidqu* (honesty), *al-amanab* (trustworthiness), *al-adalah* (just), *at-ta'awun* (mutual assistance), and *al-istiqamah* (consistency).⁴⁰ To this end, LAKPESDAM works together with institutions such as The Asia Foundation, PKM (*Program Pemulihan Keberdayaan Masyarakat*), MADIA (*Masyarakat Dialog Antar Agama*), and the World Food Programme of UNDP.

Since 2000, LAKPESDAM organizes the Public Politics Empowerment program.⁴¹ From 1996 to 2001, it states its vision to establish a community that is guaranteed of its rights (*al-dlaruriyat al-khams*), which include religion, belongings, offspring, mind, and body. Its mission was stated as empowering the NU community with the principle of *mabadi' kbairi ummah*. To achieve this, its strategies included developing religious knowledge in the construction of a civil society, positioning *kyai* as the aspirator of change, expanding the conception of the NU elites, civic education, advocacy for the marginalized grassroots level, networking with strategic groups, counter-hegemony against fundamentalism through media, and developing community-based economies.⁴²

After the 1998 reform movement, LAKPESDAM moved more systematically in building tolerant and moderate religious life through various studies and development activities. It focuses more on issues on religious life, social affairs, and culture. The strengthening of religious conservatism and radicalism wave, both within and outside NU, is seen as a threat to the moderate *aswaja* ideology. The development of moderate Islam is based on the maintenance of old traditions that are considered good, relevant, and adaptive to new findings that are better and more relevant (*al-mubafadlatu 'ala al-qadim al-shalih wa al-akhdzu bi al-jadid al-aslah*).

Realizing that democratization and civil society development in Indonesia require support from religious discourse, LAKPESDAM promotes the development of moderate Islam as

a supportive discourse to democratization. Moreover, religious radicalism, corruption, gender discrimination, and formalization of religion into politic were also issues to be resolved.⁴³ In a reflection and evaluation program called *Program Pengembangan Wacana Keagamaan Kritis bagi Aktifis Dakwah* in Jakarta, 28-29 April 2006, a strong commitment to formulate a strategy to continue a critical religious discourse in the future was found. LAKPESDAM views that one of the factors causing religious radicalism is the fact that the Muslim community cannot be critical towards their texts and traditions. Those radical groups accept everything literally and textually, so that parts of the texts that allow intolerance are practiced as they are.⁴⁴

In establishing moderate and tolerant Islam, LAKPESDAM also airs live talk show in an afternoon program called *Obrolan Agama Sore hari* (OASE), whose main theme is *Islam rahmatan lil alamin*, or Islam as a blessing for human beings and the rest of the world, and emphasizes on the importance of building a religious awareness that is anti-violence. Moreover, LAKPESDAM organized a public service advertisement with religious messages on peace, anti-violence, tolerance, poverty alleviation, corruption, religion as a blessing, gender equity, and humanitarian solidarity. The advertisement featured moderate leaders such as KH Sahal Mahfudh, KH Hasyim Muzadi, Prof Ahmad Syafi'i Ma'arif, and Dr Musdah Mulia.⁴⁵

As an NGO that works in public education, LAKPESDAM publishes a number of books, such as *Dakwah Transformatif, Memberdayakan NU: 20 Tahun Perjalanan LAKPESDAM; Kritik Nalar Fiqih NU, Voter's Guide; Neraca Gus Dur di Panggung Kekuasaan; Potret Keluarga Miskin di Tengah Krisis; Civil Society Versus Masyarakat Madani; Geger di Republik NU; NU dalam Sorotan; and Pedoman Kaderisasi NU*. The background of the book *Kritik Nalar Fiqih NU*, for example, was the strong *fiqh* tradition among NU. However, the tradition only allows the understanding of *fiqh* as they are, and forbids reinterpretation. LAKPESDAM puts significance on reforming

the tradition of *fiqh*, both in its theoretical framework (*usbul al-fiqh*) and its principles (*al-qawaid al-fiqhiyyah*).⁴⁶

The first NU Congress on Islamic Thinking was held in Situbonto, October 4-6 2003 was a significant leap for the NU younger generation. A methodology is put into the current discourse to homogenize the methodology in Islamic studies, and also as a justification that the ongoing discourse is the expansion of the thinking that exists in the old texts and the living tradition of the NU traditionalists. LAKPESDAM seeks to combine modern discourses that they find in literatures and those inherited by the *pesantren* tradition. They try to resolve, for example, conflicts between nationalism and the *ummah* concept, democracy and *syura*, and human rights, and *mabadi al-khamsab*. The basic teaching of NU, *Ablussunah wa al-jama'ab* (or *aswaja*, for short) is also expanded. One of *aswaja* concept, *Tasamu'*, meaning tolerance, is expanded to become a concept of pluralism of the modern Indonesian society with all of its elements. Other principles of *aswaja*, *at-tawassuth* (middle way), *al-ukhuwab* (brotherhood), *al-musawab* (equality), and *al-adalah* (justice) are realized in various programs to expand a critical and moderate Islamic discourse.⁴⁷

This institute does not consider power politics as neither its orientation nor its strategic issue. However, it does not mean it does not concern itself with problems of the nations. For example, LAKPESDAM participated in political education on good governance and democracy. In 2006, they cooperated with The Ford Foundation and the Network of Voters Education for Public (*Jaringan Pendidikan Pemilih untuk Rakyat/ JPPR*) to publish a Local Election Tabloid in Pekalongan, Central Java, which served as a guideline for the voters, with the aim to raise the local public's political awareness.

Moreover, LAKPESDAM Jombang organized a program called Civil Society Empowerment in the Regional Autonomy Process.⁴⁸ As for social affairs, the institute organized discussions, which respond to the controversy of the Bill on

Anti-Pornography in 2006. LAKPESDAM saw plurality in religious and cultural interpretation within the society, and it tried to analyze that from various perspectives by inviting various figures to the discussion, including Badriah Fayumi, a member of the parliament and member of the special committee to discuss the bill, and Tholhah Hasan, a representative from NU. As for religious affairs, they invited international Islamic thinkers, such as Dr Asghar Ali Engineer, Dr Hassan Hanafi, and Dr Nashr Hamid Abu Zaid. They organized campus-to-campus road shows to disseminate *rahmatan lil alamin* religious ideas. LAKPESDAM established communication and cooperation through its branches throughout Indonesia, and other NU institutions in Egypt, England and other countries, as well as with other institutions sharing the same vision and mission.⁴⁹

In carrying out its moderate mission, LAKPESDAM publishes the *Tashwirul Afkar* journal since 1997 with varying actual themes, such as: Reinterpreting *Ablussunah wal Jama'ab*; Challenging Official Discourses: Struggle at the Bottom Level of the Muslim Community; *Fikih Siyasab*: Establishing Discourse, Formulating Movement; Islamic Parties: Transformation of Islamic Movement and Democracy; Women Movement in Islam, Islam and Civil Society in Indonesia: from Conservatism to Critics; Revisiting Liberalism of Islam in NU; Post-traditionalist Islam; Towards Pluralistic Islamic Education; De-formulating *Shari'a*; Challenging Islam Fundamentalism; Islam with Local Characteristics; Rejecting Arabism: Finding Indonesian Islam; Disputing the Identity of Islam: Struggle between Islamism and Progressive Islam; and Interpreting the Words of God.⁵⁰

In its edition No. 12 (2002) with the theme "De-formalizing Islamic *Shari'a*", for example, the editors published articles from the pro-formalization groups, such as *Komite Solidaritas Islam Indonesia* (KISDI), an interview with Habieb Rizieq Shihab, Leader of *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI), and also articles by the counter-formalization supporters, such as Ahmad Syafi'i Ma'arif, the Chairman of *Muhammadiyah*, Abdullah Ahmed al-

Na'im, an intellectual from Sudan, and Muhammad Syahrur and Muhammad Said Asymawi, both intellectuals from Egypt.⁵¹

LKiS Yogyakarta, LKHAM Tasikmalaya, and LAPAR Makassar

Institute for Islamic and Social Studies (*Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial/LKiS*) started from a discussion groups and students movement in Yogyakarta in the early 1990s that were concerned with the tension in the Islam-state relations in the 1980s, particularly in the context of the role of *pesantren* in politics. Most of its activists were *ex-santri* (*pesantren* students) and students at the State Institute of Islam (*Institut Agama Islam Negeri/IAIN*) Sunan Kalijaga. This study group organized seminars and demonstrations together with other students' movements on issues, such as land affairs, female workers, impact of globalization, and literature of liberation. The New Order at that time was repressive towards Islamic movements, while the Islamic community was overly conservative.

Hence, these activists pioneered the discourse on critical Islam, with emphasis on openness and democratization. LKiS was known as a publisher of critical Islamic thinking books, such as *Agama, Demokrasi dan Keadilan* (Gramedia, 1993). LKiS also published translated books, such as *Kiri Islam* (by Kazou Shimogaki, translated by Hasan Hanafi), *Islam dan Pembebasan* (Asghar Ali Engineer), *Masyarakat Tak Bernegara* (Abdel Wahab el-Affendi), *Wahyu dan Revolusi* (Ziaul Haque), *Dekonstruksi Syariah* (Abdullah Ahmed An-Na'im), *Tekstualitas Al-Qur'an* (Nasr Hamid Abu-Zayd), *Post-Tradisionalisme Islam* (Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri), *Islam dan Demokrasi* (Fatima Mernissi) and the works of Mohammad Arkoun.

Afterwards, since its establishment in 1997 LKiS has become more systematic in conducting research, regular studies, and providing public assistance, and publishing Friday bulletins called *Al-Ikhtilaf*. It also organizes talkshows and audio-visual programs, policy advocacy, and other activities. Some of its programs reached extensive public in Aceh, West Sumatera,

South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, and West Nusa Tenggara, with the vision to the understanding of Islam in a transformative and tolerant manner within the pluralistic Indonesian community. More practically, LKiS strives to empower the marginalized groups, and eliminate forms of discrimination based on religion, social status, and gender. In 2006, for example, LKiS took part in responding to the revision of Act No. 13 (2003) on matters pertaining to manpower, Bill on anti-pornography, the tsunami tragedy in Aceh, cases of violence related to religion, the Prophet cartoon case, and other issues.

Since 1997, LKiS has regularly organized a program called Transformative and Tolerant Islam Learning (*Program Belajar Bersama Islam Transformatif dan Toleran*), which strives to formulate critical curriculum and institutionalization of Islam. It organizes classes for seven to ten days, with themes such as critical discourse on religion, Islam and politics, Islam and religious dialogues, and Islam and feminism, in which people of various background and origins participated. LKiS offers a two-year program for prospective students who wishes to study Islam intensively, which includes courses such as Humanity Studies, Islamic Studies Research Methods, History of Indonesia and Islam in Indonesia, History of *Pesantren*, Islamic Thinking, Religion and Politic, Islamic Social Ethics, and some elective courses such as Feminism, Social Advocation and Organization, Journalism, Human Rights Studies, and International Relations. LKiS graduates are expected to continue their studies to a bachelor degree on Islamic studies, social science, or humanities. They can also directly do social works in the fields such as *pesantren* development, human rights, inter-religious relations, advocation, publication, and journalism.

The trainings organized by LKiS resulted in the establishment of the Institute for Human Rights Studies (*Lembaga Kajian Hak Asasi Manusia/LKHAM*) in Tasikmalaya on 23 August 1999. Demands to return to the Jakarta Charter re-emerged in 1999, including in Tasikmalaya, where there are demands for the implementation of Islamic *Sbari'a* in the

region. LKHAM gave special attention to *pesantrens* in Tasikmalaya, which are more than 500 in number. According to Tatang Setiawan, Director of LKHAM, LKHAM introduced the ideas of tolerant and transformative Islam in *pesantrens*, because there has been a tendency towards the rejection of democracy and human rights issues in *pesantren*, because those issues are considered western. LKHAM is an NGO that provides a place for *santris* and *pesantrens* in Tasikmalaya that believes in the compatibility of Islam, human rights, and democracy.

In this regard, LKHAM tries to be a counter-movement against formalist Islam movements in Tasikmalaya, by putting forward the visions and missions of transformative and tolerant Islam to establish critical and independent civil society. LKHAM strives to spread the values of egalitarian, pluralist and anti-oppression Islam. It organizes civilian political education and nurtures critical awareness and participation. At the practical level, LKHAM pushes the policy makers to make policies that consider public interests. It organizes various activities, such as public education, relations with non-Muslim groups, *pesantren* networking, development of transformative Islam ideas, and policy advocacy programs. For the *pesantren* networking, LKHAM organizes a network of a number of *pesantrens* such as Bahrul Ulum Awipari, Sukahideng Singaparna, Sukamanah Singaparna, Cipasung Singaparna, and Miftahul Huda Manonjaya. It also continues to publish the Al-Ikhtilaf media, with circulation of 1500 copies, every Friday, distributed to around 40 mosques, campuses and schools in Tasikmalaya and Ciamis.

LKiS also cooperates with Institute for Public Advocacy and Education (*Lembaga Advokasi dan Pendidikan Rakyat*/LAPAR) in South Sulawesi, which was established on 17 April 1999. The establishment of this institute was considered as a critical reflection of the New Order development process and policies, which totally disregarded the interests of the grassroots. What happened during the era were actually marginalization, oppression, exclusion, and the abuse of social,

economic, cultural and political rights of the marginalized groups. This inspired LAPAR to be directly involved in the process to raise awareness and gather support for the grassroots people.

LAPAR emphasizes on the religious values that are considered accommodative towards local wisdom. It has a social objective to “establish a just, prosperous, critical, and equal community, and a pluralist, democratic and free-of-oppression community.” Its programs are based on principles of equality, pluralist and humanist, justice, honesty, and independence. Among its programs are studies on the social, cultural, educational and environmental problems and religious discourse on the empowerment of civil society; investigation and advocacy of the maintenance of natural resources that is just and suitable with local culture; critical education on discourse analyses; religious interpretations; gender analyses; and campaign and dissemination of the institute’s vision and mission in the form of publication of books and bulletins and radio talk shows. LAPAR maintains relations with students, farmers, and the urban poor. It strives to resolve strategic issues, such as liberation, local culture, and advocacy. At the heat of the issue of *Shari’a* formalization in South Sulawesi, LAPAR was among those that were active in making counter-hegemony in Bulukumba and other areas in South Sulawesi that are issues new local regulations influenced by Islamic *Shari’a*.⁵²

Liberal Islam Network (*Jaringan Islam Liberal* / JIL)

Compared to the NGOs mentioned earlier, JIL was among the later ones established, but has been considered the most vocal when faced with radical Islam, particularly since March 2001 within the national discourse on Islam. As a social movement and part of the civil society, JIL is particularly intellectual, both in terms of its origins and orientation. It continues to hold dialogues on political, social, cultural and most notably religious issues. JIL is a local, national, and

international product that pushes for the dynamism of Muslim young intellectuals in Indonesia. Specifically, JIL emerged as a response to and criticism towards the Islamic fundamentalism and its various expressions that took place after the fall of Suharto in 1998, particularly *Laskar Jihad*, *Front Pembela Islam*, *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia*, *Hizbut Tabrir Indonesia*, and *Partai Keadilan*.

Post-Suharto political openness was used by Islamic hardliners to be more active and vocal, which bothers and concerns a group of young people, who then forms a network with Ulil Abshor Abdalla as the coordinator. The early activists of the network include Luthfi Assyaukani, Hamid Basyaib, Ihsan Ali Fauzi, Nong Darol Mahmada, Ahmad Sahal and Goenawan Muhammad. The organization began by ideas of "Islam Yes, Islamic Parties No", de-sacralization, and secularization of Nurcholish Madjid in the 1970s, the idea of Islam reform by Ahmad Wahib in the 1970s, the movement of Indonesian Islam by Abdurrahman Wahid in the 1980s, ideas of "justice religion" by Masdar F Mas'udi, and reformist ideas of Sayyed Waliyyullah ad-Dahlawi, Ibnu Rushd, Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid, Muhammad Iqbal, Fazlur Rahman, and western philosophers such as Habermas, Paul Ricoeur, and many more. According to Ulil, JIL is a counter to the thinking of Sayyid Qutb, Al-Maududi, Sa'id Hawwa, Fathi Yakkan, and others that are influential among the fundamentalist group.⁵³

JIL is part of the liberal Islam movement that emerged independently in the Islamic world but is connected due to internet communication. With progressive young human resources, who are mostly *santri* and students with theological background, and supported by sufficient funding, JIL promotes freedom, not oppression, formalism, relativism, inclusivism, absolutism or exclusivism. It concerns itself with the minority and marginalized groups, and freedom of religion and diversity in religion and politics. In the issue of secularism, for example, JIL views that, "Islam does not oppose secularism as long as it does not mean total rejection of religion, and that the integration of religion and politics is only a recent historical

construct, not a doctrine of the Qur'an."⁵⁴ Ulil argues that JIL promotes *Sbari'a* values (*maqasid al-syariah*).

As an intellectual movement, JIL organizes discussions, publication, talkshows, public service advertisements, and many other activities. The Liberal Islam Discussion has more than 1000 members in 2004. It is an active discussion forum that covers contemporary religious affairs from different perspectives, with respect to freedom and differences of opinion. JIL publishes articles in the *Jawa Post* and *Indo Post*, which speak of the values it struggles for. It also publishes books, for example *Wacana Islam Liberal di Indonesia*, *Syariat Islam Pandangan Islam Liberal*, *Kritik terhadap Jilbab*, and *Al-Quran buat Perempuan*. JIL also broadcasts through the 68H radio station in Jakarta, and its program is aired through many other stations all over the country. Among the issues of concern are freedom of religion for all citizens, including the minority groups, such as *Abmadiyah*, inter-religious marriage, inter-religious dialogues, gender equality, democracy, and human rights. These issues develop to cover various contemporary religious problems that still require interpretation from the perspective of liberal Islam.

Although its activities are less compared to the radical Islam groups, JIL has spread influence all over Indonesia. It is both supported and criticized. Its coordinator has even been condemned death by *Forum Umat Islam Indonesia* in 2002 after he published an article titled "Revisiting Interpretation of Islam" (*Menyegarkan Kembali Pemahaman Islam*), published in *Kompas* daily on 18 November 2002.⁵⁵ The *Economist* magazine, in its 31 May 2003 edition published an article titled "Tolerance Reasserted", which wrote: "The Liberal Mr Abdalla pops up all the time on Indonesian television and radio shows. As long as the moderates keep on getting their fair share of airtime, there is every hope that the extremists will fail." The *Jakarta Post* and *Kompas* also publish reports and articles that are appreciative towards the development of liberal Islam. The fundamentalist keeps reacting to this. It continues to publish papers and speeches that condemn and call for the elimination

of JIL by labeling it blasphemy and deviation. Its office has also received threats of attack by *Front Pembela Islam* in 2005, right after MUI issued a decree that liberalism, secularism, and pluralism are forbidden by Islam.

The Muhammadiyah Young Intellectual Network (*Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah / JIMM*)

Although it existed later than the young generation of NU, JIMM surfaced with their alternative approaches to Islamic discourse. The establishment of JIMM was set in the midst of various critics towards *Muhammadiyah*, which call it stagnant. Some groups said that *Muhammadiyah* was unable to face the challenges of social problems, excess of globalization, neo-capitalism, and liberalism. According to the young generation, *Muhammadiyah* is trapped in a routine of activities, which led to a condition of tiresome, practices of bureaucracy, and pragmatism. It even led to practical politics. The young generation conducted studies and published books and journals. For example, on 18-20 November 2003 in Malang, JIMM cooperated with the Muhammadiyah Malang University in organizing a discussion on "Returning to the Qur'an, finding the spirit of the era" (*Kembali ke Al Quran, Mencari Semangat Zaman*). It aimed to map the contemporary Islam thinking, particularly those related to the Islam-West dialogue, and to find the hermeneutic key in solving current problems. Muhammadiyah's progressive paradigm, through its figures, such as Ahmad Syafi'i Ma'arif, Amin Abdullah, Abdul Munir Mulkhan, and Moeslim Abdoerrahman, became the aspirator for the young generation with the spirit to appreciate the scientific tradition of the West and *Syiah*, as long as it can contribute to the process of the Islam reform. They, for example, quote Ali Syariati, a *Syiah* intellectual residing in France, who wrote about the role of the intellectuals who are supposed to be critical, independent, and socialist in terms of supporting the marginalized and weak people. The discussion is seen as an early effort to resolve social problems, poverty,

retardation, and multidimensional crises that lead to religious unrest, and social and moral concern. The young intellectuals of Muhammadiyah were motivated to campaign for public awareness and enlightenment.⁵⁶

As one of Islamic mass organizations that stand on the spirit for reform of Muhammad Abduh, and the puritanist spirit of Ibnu Taymiyah, Muhammadiyah has "shifted" in terms of its movement. Although it has succeeded in its efforts to develop the life of the people, such as building hospitals, universities and schools, it appears to have forgotten the aspect of Islamic studies. The development of Islamic discourse within its organization reached stagnation. Its success has not satisfied the young generation. The young generation's encounter with the social fact has led to their intellectual activities.

The recent discourses promoted by the young generation of Muhammadiyah are indirect critique and expression of rebellion against the older generation. Their concern with the facts and contemporary issues, such as democratization, inter-religious relations, human rights, gender equality, civil society, globalization, and multiculturalism are their critical manner in comprehending social problems that call for a "religious resolution". The spirit to return to the Qur'an and the teachings of the Prophet (*al-ruju' ila al-Quran wa al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyah*) are not enough for the young generation, as they also call for the need to involve themselves in social and moral aspects of life.

In the 24th National Assembly of *Majelis Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Islam* of the Muhammadiyah Malang University in January 2000, it was agreed that the Islamic discourse within Muhammadiyah should not be dominated solely by issues of *akidah* and *fiqh* that are analyzed through a textual approach. Rather, it should also concern itself with various areas of Islamic thinking, in terms of theology, philosophy, *fiqh*, *tasawuf*, and social agendas. The spirit to reform religious thinking (*tajdid al din*) developed by Muhammad Abduh must still gain proportion.⁵⁷

End Notes

As has been described, moderate Islam communities, such as P3M, LAKPESDAM NU, *Jaringan Islam Emansipatoris*, LKiS, LAPAR, JIL, and JIMM, emerged in the dynamic and changing local, national and global context: diversity within the public that is considered conservative, tension in the relation between Islam and the local culture, the unresolved Islam-state problem, de-politicizing of Islam by the New Order regime, political openness, radicalization and religious conflicts, Islamic reform movement in the Middle East, and the global and regional terrorism phenomenon.

Those moderate Islam communities were established with the two mass organizations, i.e., Muhammadiyah and NU, as the bases. Thus we can see the principal continuation between the two old organizations and the new communities. However, the young generation in these new communities strives for frame diversification of the old organizations and their figures. The frame diversification is compatible with the development of discourse in the Islamic world and the local and national reality. Although their visions, missions, issues, and programs often overlap, these communities have their own focus and emphasis that are neither monolithic nor static.

Moreover, seen from their background, some groups emerged mostly as a reaction to radical or fundamentalist Islam movement. Some others have emerged before the emergence of radical Islam movement, but still strive to promote counter-discourse and counter-movement against the development of new radical Islam on the one hand, and against the image of Islam as radical and terrorists on the other. Internally, dialogues and even direct and indirect criticisms take place among moderate Islam groups, such as among the traditionalist Islam, modernist Islam, liberal Islam, post-traditionalist Islam, and emancipatory Islam. Each has different strategy, although they are similar in terms of their moderate values, such as tolerance and anti-violence. Hence, in the context of mapping of Islamic thinking and movement in Indonesia, it is impossible to solely

comprehend moderate Islam on itself without understanding the plurality of Islam, because they all emerged in the context of relation and contest of power in the public sphere within Indonesia.

Endnote

- 1 The Moderate Islam Communities can be viewed from various perspectives, such their beliefs/ideology/worldview/frame, their organization, their background, their members' objectives, their strategies, their reactions, and influence in the community. This article only focuses on paradigm, the background for their establishment, and strategies. For a study on the social movement, see for example John Lofland, *Social Movement Organizations: Guide to Research on Insurgent Realities* (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1996), 48-49.; Abdul Munir Mulkhan, "A New Social-Cultural Map for Santris," in Chaider S. Bamualim, ed., *A Portrait of Contemporary Indonesian Islam* (Jakarta: Center for Languages and Cultures & Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2005), 41.
- 2 Referring to Geertz's categorization of *santri*, *abangan*, and *priyayi*, and categorization of traditionalist-modernist, political-cultural, fundamental-liberal, great-little tradition, and global-local, it seems that each category has its own plus and minus. William Shepard, for example, offers a typology of secularist, modernist, radical Islam, traditionalist, neo-traditionalist, based on the extent to which a group reacts to modernity on the one hand and the totality of Islamic teaching on the other hand. Among According to Claude Lévi-Strauss, a French philosopher, words are tools that can be freely used by anyone as long as the meaning is clear. Muhammad Ali, "Understanding Muslim Plurality: Problems of Categorizing Moslems in Postcolonial Indonesia," *Refleksi: Jurnal Kajian Agama dan Filsafat* VII, no.2 (2005); Fernand Braudel, *A History of Civilizations*, trans. Richard Mayne (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 3; William E.Shepard, "Islam and Ideology: Towards A Typology," in Syafiq Mughni, ed., *An Anthology of Contemporary Middle Eastern History* (Montreal: McGill University & Canadian International Development Agency.), 410-437.
- 3 Ariel Cohen, "Power or Ideology: What the Islamists Choose Will Determine Their Future," *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 22, no.3 (Summer 2005): 1- 5.
- 4 John L.Esposito, "Moderate Muslims: A Mainstream of Modernists, Islamists, Conservatives, and Traditionalists," *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 22, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 11-13.
- 5 M.A. Muqtedar Khan, Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Delaware, gave a few examples of moderate figures due to their continuous call for viewing *ijtihad* based on the context of time and place: Chandra Muzaffar in Malaysia; Tariq Ramadhan in Europe; Maulana Waheeduddin Khan and Asghar Ali Engineer in India; Khalid Abul Fadl and Louay Safi in the US; Abdul Karim Soroush and Muhammad Khatami in Iran. M.A.Muqtedar Khan, "Who are Moderate Muslims?," www.ijtihad.org
- 6 There are many studies made to define and understand radical Islam. The terminologies of radical Islam, fundamentalist Islam, and revivalist Islam often overlap. See, for example, Jamhari, "Mapping Radical Islam in Indonesia", *Studia Islamika: Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies* 10, no.3 (2003): 3-28.
- 7 There have been interesting surveys and studies made on radical Islam movements, such as *Majelis Mujabidin Indonesia* (MMI), *Laskar Jibad*, *Front Pembela Islam*, and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. See, for example, Jamhari dan Jajang Jahroni, eds., *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada, 2004).
- 8 In literatures on ethnicity, there are at least three perspectives of ethnic identity. In primordial groups' view, ethnic identity is inherently given, while circumstantial groups view that ethnic group exists due to the environment. Meanwhile, the constructivists strive to combine aspects of rigidity and flexibility in ethnic identity. They view ethnic identity change according to place

- and time. Ethnic groups are actively involved in establishing their own identities. Hence, moderate Muslims are those who were influenced by the past and the environment, and are active in establishing their own identity as moderates. On the three perspectives, see Stephen Cornell & Douglas Hartmann, *Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities in a Changing World* (London: Pine Forge Press, 1998), 39-101.
- 9 Azyumardi Azra, *Jaringan Ulama Timur Tengah dan Kepulauan Nusantara Abad XVII dan XVIII* (Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, 1994), 294-296.
 - 10 See Alwi Shihab, *Islam Sufistik: "Islam Pertama" dan Pengaruhnya hingga kini di Indonesia* (Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, 2001), 36-37.
 - 11 Aqib Suminto, *Politik Islam Hindia Belanda* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985), 30.
 - 12 Deliar Noer categorized the movements of the native people at the end of the Dutch colony era as: modernist; traditionalist; and religiously neutral. See Deliar Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia 1900-1942*, Translated, 7th Ed, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1994)
 - 13 On Muhammadiyah-Ahmadiyah relations, see Herman Beck, 'the Rupture between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyah' *Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde*, BKJ, 2005.
 - 14 For example, KH Irfan Hielmy, the caretaker of the Darussalam Pesantren in Ciamis, West Java, wrote articles that can be considered moderate and open. He views that Islamic Sharia is a set of values, rules, and norms made by Allah SWT, and functions to cover all matters retaining to economy and politics, including the principles. As an expert on holy texts traditions, KH Irfan Hielmy benefits from elements of thoughts from various sources other than the Qur'an and the words of the Prophet. This includes from Ibnu Qayyim Al-Jauziyyah, Imam Al-Ghazali, Imam al-Nawawi, Muhammad Rashid Ridha, Syekh Muhammad Al-Ghazali, Syekh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, David G. Myers' Social Psychology (1983), and Susan O'Conner's writings on cultural pluralism. He also adopts the ideas of cultural democracy, and civil society, and argues that Islam cannot force the elimination of local traditions. See KH. Irfan Hielmy, *Senyuman Wahyu Penyula Kalbu: Baban Renungan Pribadi Sufi* (Ciamis: Yrama Widya dan Pusat Informasi Pesantren, 2003). His other books are *Masyarakat Madani* (1998), *Kumpulan Materi Khatbah Jum'at* (1999), *Pendekatan Keagamaan dalam Menyelesaikan Masalah Bangsa* (2000), *Wacana Islam* (2001), and *Dakwah bil Hikmah* (2002).
 - 15 Mustafa Kamal Pasha and Ahmad Adaby Darban, *Mubammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam dalam Perspektif Historis dan Ideologis* (Yogyakarta: LPPI Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, 2003), 129-134.
 - 16 *Ibid.*, 157-158.
 - 17 H.A. Wahab Radjab, *Lintasan Perkembangan dan Sumbangan Mubammadiyah di Sulawesi Selatan* (Jakarta: IPPSDM-WIN, 1999), 62-63.
 - 18 Suyoto, et.all, *Pola Gerakan Mubammadiyah Ranting: Ketegangan antara Purifikasi dan Dinamisasi* (Jogjakarta: IRCiSoD, 2005).
 - 19 Muhamad Ali, "Terorisme dan Militansi Agama," *Kompas*, 8 Maret 2002; Jamhari dan Jajang Jahroni, eds., *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia* (Jakarta: RajaGrafindo Persada, 2004), 235.
 - 20 Giora Eliraz, *Islam in Indonesia: Modernism, Radicalism, and the Middle East Dimension* (Brighton dan Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2004), 24.
 - 21 Mukhtar Muhammadiyah, *Pedoman Hidup Islami Warga Mubammadiyah* (Jakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2000), 1-5; 18-21.
 - 22 Dikutip dalam Haedar Nashir, *Ideologi Gerakan Mubammadiyah* (Jakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2001), 19-20.
 - 23 *Ibid.*, 86-87.
 - 24 On this debate, see Mukhaer and Nur Ahmad, eds., *Mubammadiyah Menjempit Perubahan: Tafsir Baru Gerakan Sosial-Ekonomi-Politik* (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas & STIE Ahmad Dahlan Jakarta, 2005).
 - 25 Andre Feillard, 11-43.
 - 26 Ahmad Siddiq, "Hubungan Agama dan Pancasila", in *Kajian Agama dan Masyarakat*, pp.255-268; quoted by M. Syafiq Anwar, *Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia: Sebuah Kajian tentang Cendekiawan Muslim Orde Baru* (Jakarta: Penerbit Paramadina, 1995), 207-208; Andrée Feillard, *NU vis-à-vis Negara: Pencarian Isi, Bentuk dan Makna* terj. Lesmana (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1999), 185-249.
 - 27 Quoted in Andrée Feillard, *NU vis-à-vis Negara: Pencarian Isi, Bentuk dan Makna* trans. Lesmana (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1999), 250.
 - 28 *Ibid.*, 413-415.
 - 29 Abdurrahman Wahid, *Mengurai Hubungan Agama dan Negara* (Jakarta: Grasindo, 1999); M. Imdadun Rahmat et. al., *Islam Pribumi: Mendialogkan Agama Membaca Realitas* (Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga, 2003); Muhamad Ali, "Islam and the Nation State: The Religio-Political Thought of Abdurrahman Wahid," thesis for Master of Science, Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, 2001.
 - 30 See www.muslimat-nu.or.id
 - 31 Giora Eliraz, *Islam in Indonesia: Modernism, Radicalism and the Middle East Dimension* (Brighton & Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2004), 78-83; Bahtiar Effendy, "What is Political Islam? An Examination of Its Theoretical Mapping in Modern Indonesia", in Chaider S. Bamualim, ed., *A Portrait of Contemporary Indonesian Islam* (Jakarta: Center for Languages and Cultures & Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2005), 25-26.
 - 32 Abdul Munir Mulkhan, "A New Social-Cultural Map for Santris," in Chaider S. Bamualim, ed., *A Portrait of Contemporary Indonesian Islam* (Jakarta: Center for Languages and Cultures & Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2005), 41.
 - 33 Marzuki Wahid, "Post-Tradisionalisme Islam: Gairah Baru Pemikiran Islam di Indonesia," *Taswif al-Afkar*, no.10 (2001): 14-15.
 - 34 Martin van Bruinessen, *NU, Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa, Pencarian Wacana Baru* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1997), 233-234.
 - 35 P3M's expert staffs during its starting period had various backgrounds, for example Ivan A. Haidar (anthropology), Dr Mansour Faqih (andragogy), Lies Marcoes-Natsir (gender), Helmi Ali (training), Muchtar Abbad (public development) and Wardah Hafidz (gender). Meanwhile, the founding members of P3M were KH Jusuf Hasyim, KH Sahal Mahfudh, Dr Tuty Alawiyah, KH Abdurrahman Wahid, Adi Sasono, Soetjipto Wirosarjono, and M. Dawam Rahardjo. The chair of the board of directors was Masdar F. Mas'udi.
 - 36 On the thinking that influences the Network, see its bibliography on the hermeneutics of the Qur'an: 1). *Maqbum al-Nashb* (Textual aspect of the Qur'an)-Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid; 2). *Naqd al-Khitab ad-Dimi* (Critique on religious discourse)- Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid; 3). *An-Nashb as-Sultbah*, al-Haqiqah (Text on Authority of the Truth)-Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid; and, 4). *Al-Fann al-Qashabi fi al-Qur'an al-Karim* (The Qur'an is not a historical document)-Ahmad Muhammad Khalafullah; 5). *Toward an Islamic Reformation*- bdullahi Ahmed an-Na'im; 6). *Speak in God's Name*-Khaled Abou El-Fadl; 7). *Lectures du Coran*-M. Arkoun; 8). *Reconstructing the history of the Qur'an*-Taufik Adnan Amal; 9). *Emancipatory Islam*-Very Verdiansyah; 10). *Three Faces of Hermeneutics; An Introduction to Current Theories of Understanding*-Roy J. Howard; 11). *Truth dan Methods*-Gadamer; 12). *The World, Critics and Text*-Edward Said. For social analysis: 1). *Social Theory* (Teori-Teori Sosial)-Peter Beilharz; 2). *Power/ Knowledge (Wacana Kuasa/ Pengetahuan)*-Michel Foucault; 3). *Power and Culture*-Piere Bordiu; 4). *BASIS Journal*, special edition on Pierre Bordieu; 5). *Totalitarianism I,II,III*-Hannah Arendt. On the theology of liberation: 1). *Mahatma Gandbi and His Apostles*-Ved Mehta; 2). *Theology of liberation of Gustavo Gutierrez*-A. Suryawasita, S.J.; 3). *Hermeneutics of Liberation*-Ilham B. Saenong; 4). *Theology of liberation*-Fr. Wahono Nitiprawiro; 5). *Mahatma Gandbi-VCD*; 6). *Malcolm X-VCD*; 7). *Liberation Islam*-Ali Asghaar Engineer; 8). *Modern Islam*-Ali Asghar Engineer; and 9). *Al-Qur'an, Pluralism & Liberating the Oppressed*-Farid Essack.

- 37 See Very Verdiansyah, *Islam Emansipatoris: Menafsir Agama untuk Praksis Pembebasan* (Jakarta: P3M dan Ford Foundation, 2004); Mojeeb el, "Islam Emansipatoris: Sebuah Upaya "Kritisisme Reperitif", book review, *Refleksi: Jurnal Kajian Agama dan Filsafat* VI, no.2 (2004): 219-225.
- 38 www.LAKPESDAM.or.id
- 39 Mahrus El-Mawa, M. Imdadun Rahmat, Izzuddin Washil, *20 Tahun Perjalanan LAKPESDAM Memberdayakan Warga NU* (Jakarta: LAKPESDAM NU, 2005), 69.
- 40 Ibid., 80.
- 41 Ibid., 111-112.
- 42 Ibid., 161.
- 43 Ibid., pp. 171-6.
- 44 www.LAKPESDAM.or.id
- 45 Mahrus El-Mawa, M. Imdadun Rahmat, Izzuddin Washil, *20 Tahun Perjalanan LAKPESDAM Memberdayakan Warga NU* (Jakarta: LAKPESDAM NU, 2005), 182-183.
- 46 www.LAKPESDAM.or.id
- 47 Rizqon Khamami, "Fenomena Intelektual Muda NU dan Muhammadiyah," *Duta Masyarakat*, 14 November 2003; Mahrus El-Mawa, M. Imdadun Rahmat, Izzuddin Washil, *20 Tahun Perjalanan LAKPESDAM: Memberdayakan Warga NU* (Jakarta: LAKPESDAM NU, 2005), 146.
- 48 LAKPESDAM views Pekalongan as a significant and strategic place. During the New Order era, Pekalongan was a basis of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), the rival of Golongan Karya (Golkar). www.LAKPESDAM.or.id
- 49 The important figures of LAKPESDAM NU (2004-2009) consist of religious leaders and NU Muslim intellectuals, such as KH Achmad Idris Marzuki, KH Said Siraj, Ahmad Bagdja, Nasaruddin Umar, and Masykuri Abdillah. LAKPESDAM NU is driven by the young generation of NU, such as Nashihin Hasan, Yahya Ma'shum, Ala'i Najib, and Yanur; www.LAKPESDAM.or.id; Mahrus El-Mawa, M. Imdadun Rahmat, Izzuddin Washil, *20 Tahun Perjalanan LAKPESDAM: Memberdayakan Warga NU* (Jakarta: LAKPESDAM NU, 2005), 185.
- 50 Mahrus El-Mawa, M. Imdadun Rahmat, Izzuddin Washil, *20 Tahun Perjalanan LAKPESDAM: Memberdayakan Warga NU* (Jakarta: LAKPESDAM NU, 2005), 181-182.
- 51 LAKPESDAM and TAF, *Tasbuiatul Afkar: Jurnal Refleksi Pemikiran Keagamaan & Kebudayaan*, "Deformalisasi Syariat", no.12, 2002.
- 52 Brochure published by LAPAR; "Negeri Syariah Tinggal Selangkah," *Gatra* XII, no.25 (6 May 2006).
- 53 Muhamad Ali, "The Rise of the Liberal Islam Network (JIL) in Contemporary Indonesia", *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* .22, no.1 (Winter 2005):1-4.; Email dialogue between Ulil Abshar Abdalla and H.M. Nur Abdurrahman 14-24 December 2002, transcribed in Ulil Abshar Abdallah *et al*, *Islam Liberal & Fundamental: Sebuah Pertarungan Wacana* (Yogyakarta: eLSAQ Press, 2005), 302-303.
- 54 Muhamad Ali, "the Rise of the Liberal Islam Network...", 10.
- 55 On the debate between Liberal Islam and Fundamental Islam in mass media, see Ulil Abshar Abdallah *et al*, *Islam Liberal & Fundamental: Sebuah Pertarungan Wacana* (Yogyakarta: eLSAQ Press, 2005).
- 56 From this discussion, Muhammadiyah cadres came forward, such as Zuly Qodir, Happy Susanto, A Fuad Fanani, Piet A Khaidir, Zakiyuddin Baidhawiy, Pradana Boy, and Ai Fatimah Nur Fuad. Andar Nubowo, "Kebangkitan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah," *Kompas*, 17 November 2003; Rizqon Khamami, "Fenomena Intelektual Muda NU dan Muhammadiyah," *Duta Masyarakat*, 14 November 2003.
- 57 Rizqon Khamami, "Fenomena Intelektual Muda NU dan Muhammadiyah," *Duta Masyarakat*, 14 November 2003.

CHAPTER 10

Urban Sufism: The Change and Continuity of the Tasawwuf Teaching

Oman Fathurabman

Introduction

In a show on a private TV channel, a group of people were shown crying while reciting the *dhikr* (remembering God), *tasbîh*, *tahmîd*, *takbîr*, and *tablîl*. Some of them were even lamenting when the *Ustadz* who is leading the activity starts reciting words of remorse to the Lord. *Ustadz* Haryono, is the one leading the prayers. Dressed in white, *Ustadz* Haryono who is also the head of the al-Madinah pesantren in Pasuruan, East Java, is followed by those attending the *dhikr* and prayers rituals. He is currently part of the religious phenomena that have recently turned into a trend in the urban areas.

From time to time, the *jamaah* (followers) attending his *dhikr* and prayers keep increasing in numbers, not only from the general public, but also actors, celebrities, government officials, and members of the middle and upper class society from all over Indonesia. More than just *dhikr* and prayers, *Ustadz* Haryono's attractiveness increased with the opening of a 'spiritual healing clinic' in his residence in Bekasi, using his *dhikr* rituals. His house is filled with 'patients' almost all the time, with various problems and diseases.

Ustadz Haryono is not alone. In the capital, *Ustadz* Arifin Ilham has also become the 'idol' for the urban people seeking